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brought increased interaction with
American warships, naval auxiliaries,
and military aircraft, reminiscent of
the Cold War. The United States and
China signed the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in
1998, modeled after INCSEA. Winkler
notes, however, that the MMCA lacks
the level of trust established between
the Soviet and American navies, and
therefore has been less effective.
The high seas and contested littorals
were the front line of U.S.-Soviet interaction during the Cold War. Winkler’s
book provides an intimate look at
the development and execution of a
landmark agreement between adversaries that provided a key mechanism
for ensuring that their interaction at
sea remained professional and kept
the Cold War from becoming hot.
JAMES P. MCGRATH III

The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945, by David Hobbs. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2015. 480 pages. $59.95.

This work is the latest in a series
of books from this author about
Royal Navy aircraft carriers, and British
carrier aviation in particular. It takes
the story forward from where his last
work on the British Pacific Fleet left
us—in the misty waters of Tokyo Bay
in September 1945. Hobbs shows how
the ethos of naval strike warfare that
had been developed and honed in the
rigors of World War II survived the
many and varied challenges that the
postwar era threw at it. Most obviously,
perhaps, it is a study of naval retrenchment under that most demanding of
scenarios: demobilization after a world
war coupled with a broader and ongoing
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retreat from global preeminence. It is
no surprise, then, that budgetary issues
take center stage, but Hobbs manages
to make his account much more than
a mere litany of what might have been.
He charts moments of gritty determination and ingenuity mixed with some
unforgivable and almost criminal areas
of waste and abuse—features that are
certainly familiar to anyone involved in
military planning. Above all, though,
an unswerving belief from within the
service about the value of its aviation has
allowed the capability to be resurrected
almost from the dead in recent years,
in the form of two large carriers with
real strike capability. This fact alone
makes this book a compelling read.
It is difficult to imagine a more qualified
individual than Hobbs to guide us
through this story. After a thirty-year
naval career as an aviator that spanned
the last years of the “big deck” carriers,
the “through-deck” cruiser era, and
right up to the “renaissance” after the
Falklands War, Hobbs capped this off
with a period working in naval records
and as the curator of the Fleet Air Arm
Museum. This gave him almost unparalleled access to the necessary archival
material, a resource he has used to
great effect in this volume. The book is
nothing short of exacting in its research.
That said, and although he tries valiantly
to hide it, Hobbs clearly has a message
he is anxious to communicate. It is, as he
freely admits, “in part my own story” (p.
vii). His thesis, which he openly reveals
in the last few pages, is that Britain
would have been better served had it
continued to replace its strike carriers
from the 1960s onward. While an understandable and legitimate viewpoint,
it is just that—a viewpoint—and many
will bemoan this lack of objectivity,
particularly as the broader constraints
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acting on the British government during
this period are given scant attention.
Equally, the work would have benefited
from a deeper dive into the effectiveness
of the military advice to the politicians,
something that the loss of the service
ministries in 1964 did little to improve.
Although broadly chronological, the
book is perhaps best examined in terms
of its three main themes: the carrier
operations themselves, the ongoing
innovations to overcome operating
constraints, and the political considerations surrounding carrier acquisition.
As explained above, the author is
perhaps least successful with the last of
these, where his experiences at the front
line have tended to cloud his objectivity. Where, for example, is a balanced
assessment of any opposing political
constraints? Luckily, though, Hobbs is at
his best with the other two, which makes
the work valuable in its own right and
tends to carry it through any shortcomings elsewhere. The day-to-day coverage
of the main carrier operations is detailed
but easy to follow and clearly fulfills
the need to demonstrate the ongoing
relevance of this capability to a maritime
nation with global interests, such as
Great Britain. Likewise, the coverage
of the British innovations that have
made carrier airpower the formidable
asset it is today is comprehensive. The
angled deck, the mirror landing aid,
the steam catapult, the development
of helicopter carriers, and the ski
jump—all are given the prominence
they deserve, along with some other
ideas that were less successful.
In the end, the ongoing relevance of a
discussion over the viability of carriers,
particularly given the expense of the new
Ford class and their perceived vulnerability to a new generation of antiship
weapons, is sure to encourage a wide
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interest in this book, particularly from
within the U.S. Navy. This is a good
thing, since many of the constraints
that Great Britain had to face are
essentially cyclical in nature and tend
to recur in similar forms over time.
In particular, though, I commend this
book to the acquisition community, if
only to gain an appreciation for how
out of step with each other politicians and operators can become.
ANGUS ROSS

The Law of War: A Detailed Assessment of the US
Department of Defense Law of War Manual, by
William H. Boothby and Wolff Heintschel von
Heinegg. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2018. 479 pages. $150.

Perhaps no recent document published
by the Department of Defense (DoD)
has been more studied, reviewed, and
criticized than its Law of War Manual.
Initially released in June 2015, it already
has received multiple updates. These updates occur partly because of the flurry
of well-considered criticism from both
academics and practitioners. However,
no effort at reviewing the manual has
been more exhaustive than this recently
published book by two of Europe’s most
eminent international law scholars.
The Law of War represents a remarkable
effort and should occupy a spot on the
bookshelf of anyone seriously studying
international law as it applies to military
operations. However, readers also should
be careful to understand what it is. It is
not a traditional treatise on the law of
war; rather, it is a deliberate—
paragraph-by-paragraph—review of
DoD’s Law of War Manual and must
be read alongside that document.
Those readers lacking an existing
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